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Current estimates of the surplus of natural gas
range between two and four trillion cubic feet.
What happened? How did the United States
move so quickly from an economy that seemed
unable to get enough natural gas to one with
such a large surplus? The answer appears to lie
in a combination of economic and regulatory
effects that have interacted somewhat differently upon different segments of the economy.
Conservation was an important factor. Natural gas demand for residential and commercial
purposes declined 12 percent and 18 percent,
respectively, from 1979 to 1986 as a result of
lower thermostat settings and increased efficiency of furnaces, air conditioners, and appliances. Millions of home owners and business
people insulated their attics, installed storm
windows, caulked the seams of their buildings,
and replaced energy inefficient appliances with
equipment that worked better on less natural
With the penetrating vision of hindsight, it gas or electricity.
Structural change and fuel switching were
is apparent that both buyers and sellers of natural gas made fundamental mistakes in negoti- also important in the decline of demand for natating gas contracts during the 1970s. Producers ural gas, particularly in the industrial and elecand pipelines overestimated future demand, trical utility sectors. The use of natural gas in
with the result that they entered into long-term industry and for the generation of electricity,
contracts at unrealistically high prices and with which together still account for nearly half of
huge take-or-pay obligations. The result of these the total demand, dropped approximately 19
errors has been that thousands of producers have percent from 1979 to 1986. Increased effinot received payments that they counted on to ciency of equipment played a role in the decontinue their businesses, and the financial well- cline, but more important was the profound
being of several large pipelines has been thrown structural change in U.S. industry away from
energy intensive uses of natural gas during the
into jeopardy.
Bitter experience with gas contracts of the period. For example, U.S. steel production de1970s has taught those associated with the nat- clined 40 percent during the years in question.
ural gas industry lessons that are reflected in a To some degree, high-tech industries replaced
new breed of contract. Sensitivity to market steel in our economy, and making computer
conditions is the watchword for the hard times chips consumes much less natural gas than making steel girders.
of the 1980s.
Fuel switching, from gas to oil and coal,
Both buyers and sellers grossly misjudged
what the demand for natural gas would be in was a second factor causing a decline in industhe 1980s as they negotiated in the 1970s. While trial and electric generating demand for natural
supply remained relatively stable, the demand gas. The gas shortage of the 1970s led busifor natural gas shrunk approximately 21 per- nesses constructing new industrial plants and
cent between 1979 and 1986, from 20.2 tril- utility generating plants to install fuel switching
lion cubic feet to 16.0 trillion cubic feet. The capacity so that they could keep their doors
following statistics, from the 1987-88 edition open even if they could not get natural gas.
of Natural Gas Trends, published by Arthur When the prices of oil and coal began to slide,
Anderson & Co. and Cambridge Energy Re- fuel switching capacity was used to lower operating costs. The decline in the use of gas was
search Associates, summarize-the decline:
accelerated by the Power Plant and Industrial
Natural Gas Consumption in
Fuel Use Act of 1978, which prohibited the
Trillions of Cubic Feet
construction of new electrical generating plants
Residen. CommerElectric
that burned natural gas. Though we now have
Year
tial
cial
Industrial Utilities
Other
a gas surplus and the Fuel Use Act was repealed
in 1987, we have a whole generation of electric
1979 .... 5.0
2.8
6.8
3.2
2.2
facilities that cannot burn gas, and twenty years
1986 .... 4.4
2.3
5.2
2.6
1.6
of industrial plants that can rapidly switch from
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When the demand
for naturalgas
declined sharply in
the 1980s, long
contract terms
exacerbated the
disputes between
producers and
pipelines.
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gas to coal to oil and back again, some literally
on a daily basis. Natural Gas Trends estimates
that nearly 40 percent of end-use consumption
presently occurs in facilities with some alternative fuel capacity and that at least a third of
the combined industrial and electrical generation markets can switch at virtually no cost
within a few days.
The interaction of conservation, structural
change, and fuel switching was exacerbated by
rising prices to natural gas consumers. While
oil prices peaked in 1981, natural gas prices at
the burner tip continued to increase until 1984,
rising 28 percent in the three-year period before turning modestly downward for residential
users and sharply downward for industrial and
electrical users. As will be discussed below, gas
contract provisions were partly responsible for
the rise of prices in the face of a decline in
demand. So too was the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA), which provided for incentive
pricing.
In the early 1970s, policy makers were convinced that this country would never again have
enough natural gas. A variety of policies to encourage conservation and promote new production were implemented, chief of which was the
NGPA. The NGPA was based upon the premise
that natural gas prices should be deregulated,
but it sought to protect the U.S. economy against
"price shock" by postponing deregulation until
1985 and extending federal regulation to the
intrastate market. The scheme of the NGPA was
to regulate prices at ever higher levels until the
gap between the regulated price and the free
market price was small, at which time deregulation would begin. NGPA worked-it stabilized
supply and provided a structured escalation of
regulated prices-but it actually accelerated the
decline in natural gas demand. Many of NGPA's
"maximum lawful prices," which were translated into actual prices paid by the gas contracts
of the 1970s, exceeded the free market price
well before 1985.
When oil prices plunged in early 1986,
however, the NGPA deregulation process had
already begun, and prices on the growing spot
market dropped like a rock. According to Natural Gas Trends, the spot price for gas delivered to major pipelines from the Texas offshore
producing area fell from $2.18 per mcf in January 1986 to $1.41 per mcf in November 1986.
Prices have recovered somewhat since then, but
they remain sensitive to the prices of competing
fuels.
In the late 1980s, natural gas has become
just another fuel which must compete with coal
and oil-and perhaps garbage and surplus

corn-for market share. Natural gas must now
compete in a free market.

Contracts of the Seventies
As many producers and pipelines negotiated gas contracts in the 1970s, they did not
anticipate the decline in natural gas demand of
the 1980s. In fact, their contracts exacerbated
the decline in demand. Three contract provisions lay at the heart of the problem-the term,
quantity, and price escalator clauses. These provisions contributed to the inflexibility of the
market for natural gas, which in turn accelerated the decline in demand.
Gas contracts of the 1970s were for long
terms. Twenty-five-year or "life-of-the-well"
agreements were common, as they had been
since the interstate pipelines were built. In part,
long terms reflected regulatory requirements.
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 required that gas
dedicated to interstate commerce be subject to
a minimum fifteen-year contract. Economic
considerations also demanded long terms. Longterm commitments were a condition of the
complex financing arrangements entered into
for the construction of many of the interstate
pipelines. Even after the construction loans were
paid, the maintenance and operation of pipelines generated high fixed costs, so that pipeline gas buyers placed long contract terms as a
high priority in negotiations.
When the demand for natural gas declined
sharply in the 1980s, long contract terms exacerbated the disputes between producers and
pipelines. However bad a deal may be, it is easier to tolerate it for a short term than for many
years.
How much of a commodity will be taken
at a given price is as important as the price itself
in determining profitability. Gas wells will not
always deliver when gas is desired, however,
and purchasers' needs vary with the season and
the state of the economy. Therefore, gas contracts of the 1970s typically contained lengthy
and complicated provisions addressing the
quantity of gas that the seller was obligated to
provide and the amounts that the buyer had to
take.
The most important of the quantity provisions usually seen in 1970s gas contracts was
the take-or-pay clause. A take-or-pay clause obligates a purchaser to pay for a percentage of
the gas which the producer can produce,
whether or not the purchaser actually takes it.
Take-or-pay clauses usually permit the purchaser to make up gas paid for but not taken.
The clause provides the producer with a guar-

anteed minimum cash flow in return for dedicating the gas supply to the purchaser.
In the 1970s, pipelines often used favorable take-or-pay terms as an incentive to induce
producers to sell to them. Price regulation under the Natural Gas Act and the NGPA effectively barred price competition by purchasers,
so pipelines competed by offering attractive
nonprice terms. Producers saw the clauses as
risk-shifting devices that would protect them
against demand fluctuations. Take-or-pay percentages increased from as low as 35 percent
in the early 1970s to 90 percent at the height
of the boom.
When gas demand declined sharply, many
pipelines found themselves confronted with
huge liabilities. Estimates vary widely, but total
potential liability of U.S. pipelines was probably in the range of $15-30 billion over the life
of their contracts. Several major pipelines confronted contingent liabilities several times the
value of their assets.
Producers faced serious difficulties also, for
they had never dreamed that pipelines would
neither take nor pay. However, that is exactly
what happened. The Natural Gas Supply Association estimated in 1987 that only 2.6 percent
of the outstanding take-or-pay obligations for
1984-85 had been paid.
In the mid- 1980s, the take-or-pay problem
was exacerbated in the short run by the efforts
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to deregulate the natural gas industry.
In 1984, FERC Order 380 permitted the customers of interstate pipelines to escape the burdens of variable-cost minimum bill provisions.
Minimum bill provisions were similar to takeor-pay clauses in that customers were required
to pay for minimum quantities of gas whether
or not they actually took the gas. In 1985, FERC
Order 436 provided a combination of carrots
and sticks to encourage pipelines to elect to
become open access transporters of natural gas.
One result of FERC's efforts was the creation of
a burgeoning spot market for natural gas in
which pipelines function as transporters rather
than as merchants. According to Natural Gas
Trends, major pipeline companies sold only 7
tcf of the 16.2 tcf of natural gas used in 1986.
Another result was that take-or-pay liabilities of
pipelines soared as consumers turned to the spot
market for cheaper gas.
Litigation over take-or-pay clauses boomed
in the mid-1980s. Producers brought billions
of dollars of claims for take-or-pay payments
against their pipeline purchasers. Facing financial ruin, the pipelines resisted fiercely, raising
a variety of affirmative defenses.

Force majeure and commercial impracticability are the most important defenses against
take-or-pay claims, but they have been effective
only infrequently. The force majeure defense
is based upon contractual provisions that define
when the parties are to be relieved of their obligations. It has rarely succeeded because the
language of the force majeure clause in gas contracts does not ordinarily define market failure
as a force majeure event. Moreover, the courts
have been reticent to find that a few words in
a "boilerplate" clause are intended to override
the lengthy and detailed take-or-pay provisions.
The commercial impracticability defense has its
roots in the common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. Performance is excused if made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency that the parties had assumed would not
occur. Thus far, the courts have generally rejected the notion that failure of the gas market
is a basis for commercial impracticability; there
have been market disruptions for as long as there
has been a gas industry. A better argument for
the pipelines, which has not yet been fully
tested, is that FERC's restructuring of the gas
industry by Order 380 and Order 436 is a basis
for a defense of commercial impracticability.
The strength of this argument, however, turns
on when the contract was executed; it should
have been apparent well before Order 380 was
proposed that the market was not functioning.

pipelines
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contingent
liabilitiesseveral
times the value
of their assets.
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to ease the pipelines' predicatried
ment with Order 500, requiring producers who
wish to transport gas to offer the transporting
pipelines volume-for-volume credits against
take-or-pay liabilities. Still, billions of dollars of
claims are before the courts, and many producers (or their bankruptcy trustees) may decide
that continuing litigation over long-term, highpriced, high-percentage take-or-pay contracts is
more profitable than producing and selling gas.
The legacy of the contracts of the 1970s continues to trouble the natural gas industry.
In addition to long terms and minimum take
requirements, 1970's contracts included price
adjustment terms which exacerbated the purchasers' burdens. The long-term contracts of the
1970s contained price adjustment provisions
because the parties could foresee that the initial
price agreed upon when the contract was formed
would not be likely to be fair over the long run.
Price adjustment provisions in gas contracts of
the 1970s usually reflected the premise that
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what went up would never come down and that
a fair price for natural gas would always be
higher in the future than in the past. A variety
of escalator clauses were included, often with
the proviso that the clause that yielded the highest legal price would apply. As a result, contract
prices climbed steadily higher, increasing the
burden of take-or-pay obligations.
Gas contracts of the 1970s often included
definite price adjustment clauses, provisions that
called for periodic fixed or percentage price
escalations. Definite price adjustment provisions invariably ratcheted the contract price
higher. I have never seen a definite price adjustment clause that provided for a downward
adjustment.
Contracts of the 1970s also usually contained a variety of indefinite price escalator
clauses, by which the price was redetermined
by reference to factors outside the contract itself. Two such clauses, the "area rate" clause
and "the most favored nations" clause were particularly troublesome, for they worked together
to push contract prices upward in a stair step
fashion, while demand slid down the bannister.
Area rate clauses were common to contracts
covering gas that was subject to federal price
regulation at the time the contract was executed. An area rate clause provides for periodic
price increases to the highest price permitted
by the appropriate regulatory body for gas being
sold in the area. After passage of the NGPA, FERC
held that area rate clauses might be triggered
by maximum lawful prices established under
the NGPA. As a result, the price of large quantities of "old" gas escalated sharply and then
adjusted upward each month.
The favored nations clause tied the contract
price to prices being paid in the area for gas of
comparable quantity and quality at the time of
sale. Once the incentive prices approved by the
NGPA began to be paid, however, area rate
clauses operated to increase the price for "old"
categories of natural gas to the maximum prices
permitted by NGPA. The favored nations clause
in one contract was often triggered by the area
rate clause in another. Thus, each monthly increase in the maximum lawful price permitted
by the NGPA set off a new round of contract
price increases.
Other indefinite price adjustment provisions in gas contracts of the 1970s that might
have made contract prices responsive to demand were drafted so that they did not apply.
Parties to 1970s-era gas contracts who anticipated that the federal government would eventually cease regulating gas prices at the wellhead
often included a "price renegotiation" clause

to set out the procedures for negotiation in a
free market. Most 1970s renegotiation provisions worked only one way, however, permitting renegotiation only at the demand of the
producer. Furthermore, they applied only after
price deregulation. The decline in demand predated official price deregulation in 1985, and
the pipelines wanted to renegotiate, not the
producers. Thus, price renegotiation clauses
were ineffective in counteracting price increases mandated by area rate and favored nations clauses.
The "price index" clause was a second type
of indefinite price escalator provision often seen
in 1970s gas contracts that might have made
contract prices responsive to market demand,
but did not. A price index clause sets price by
reference to changes in the indices of prices for
other fuels, particularly those that compete with
natural gas. Price index clauses in gas contracts
of the 1970s included oil reference clauses
(which keyed prices to the price of fuel oil in
the primary market area of the purchaser), imported gas reference clauses (which adjusted
the price by reference to changes in the price
of gas imported from Canada or Mexico), and
electric reference clauses (which provided for
changes in natural gas prices by reference to
changes in the price of electricity). In most
1970s contracts, however, price index clauses,
like renegotiation clauses, were triggered only
at the option of the seller, and the seller was
entitled to the highest price determined by any
variation of the clause or by any other price
escalator clause. Thus, price index clauses had
little effect upon the inexorable increases of gas
prices.
The combination of high take-or-pay percentages, escalating prices, and collapsing market demand for natural gas would have been
even more devastating for the industry had it
not been for the "market-out" clause. A marketout clause, or an economic-out clause, as it is
frequently termed, permits a natural gas purchaser to demand lower prices or to cancel the
contract when the price set by the price escalation provisions is too high. Market-out clauses
appeared frequently in contracts by 1980. They
reflected the concern of some purchasers that
the price surge that began in the mid-1970s
would ultimately make natural gas uncompetitive with other fuels.
A market-out clause generally permits the
gas purchaser to lower the price at the wellhead
when gas purchased at that price cannot be sold
profitably in the purchaser's primary market.
Early versions of the market-out clause were obContinued on page 46

tion of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)
affect public participation in management of
federal public lands. She argues public intervention rights should be granted broadly at the
initial stages of administrative BLM proceedings, but that public intervention in or right of
appeal to the IBLA should be restricted based
on the person's ability to enhance the decisionmaking process. This interest representation
model would closely reflect the broad jurisdiction and mandate of the BLM.

Solid and
Hazardous
Waste
Abraham, "Environmental Liability and the
Limits of Insurance," 88 Columbia Law Review 942 (1988). The author reviews the impact of environmental liability on the liability
insurance market. The causes of the liability insurance crisis of the mid-1980s are examined.
The author posits that, whereas in most fields
of tort law liability insurance has followed developing law, the environmental law area has
not evidenced the same willingness of insurance providers to cover the risk. This may be
due to special considerations present in the environmental liability field, which the author
contends courts and legislators should take into
account.

Glass, "Superfund and SARA: Are There Any
Defenses Left?" 12 Harvard Environmental
Law Review 385 (1988). The author reviews
the liability imposed on private parties by the
Superfund law. She contends that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has zealously
and systematically sought expansion of Superfund liability on all fronts, which the courts
have granted almost completely. She argues that
EPA's motivation has been to establish a "deep
pocket" assessment of liability, and she attempts to demonstrate this through a detailed,
up-to-date discussion of virtually every defense
that has ever been raised to Superfund liability.
She concludes that recent developments, such
as the 1986 amendments to the Act, may indicate an era of fault-related imposition of liability.
James, "Financial Institutions and Hazardous Waste Litigation: Limiting the Exposure to
Superfund Liability," 28 Natural Resources
Journal 329 (1988). The author focuses his
discussion on the Superfund liability that falls
upon financial institutions which foreclose upon
security interests in active disposal facilities or
become the innocent subsequent owners of
abandoned hazardous waste sites. He recommends a course of action for financial institutions to take to minimize the risk of unintentionally assuming such liabilities, including
indemnifications, environmental risk assessments, and environmental audits.

Lessons of the Seven ities
jective, providing for price adjustment by reference to competing fuels:
If at any time Buyer's average rolled-in gas cost
at
, including all transportation and allocable costs, exceeds the BTU equivalent cost
of the lowest priced #2 fuel oil, as officially
posted the first business day of each month by
area, Buyer shall
Platts Oilgram for the
have the right to redetermine the price for gas
purchased and sold hereunder.
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Later versions of the market-out clause gave the
buyer broad discretion to determine when price
adjustment was necessary. For example:
Notwithstanding any other provisions in this
agreement, the price to be paid for any gas delivered or for which payment is due hereunder
including taxes, shall never exceed ... a price
which will prevent buyer's resale of gas from
its pipeline system to its customers. Buyer, in
its sole opinion, will determine whether the
purchase of gas under the pricing provisions
hereof will result in gas prices which buyer's
customers will not be willing to pay.

Continuedfrom page 6

Pipelines that had market-out clauses in
their contracts could force contract prices
downward so as to compete for market share.
Without such clauses, both the decline in
demand and the take-or-pay carnage among
pipelines would have been worse. Of course,
producers whose contracts contained these
strange provisions-which were not exercised
until 1982-are less sanguine about their effect.

A New Generation of

Gas Contracts
The hard times of the natural gas industry
in the 1980s and the changes in its structure
are reflected in a new generation of gas contracts. As the industry moves into the 1990s,
the watchwords of contract drafters are flexibility and market responsiveness.
One apparent difference between gas contracts of the 1970s and the new generation of

gas contracts is the identity of the purchaser.
Contracts of the 1970s were almost always
between producers and pipelines. Pipelines
bought gas from producers and then sold it to
local distribution companies, which in turn
supplied end users-residences, businesses, industrial plants, and electrical generators. As a
result of FERC Order 436, however, most pipelines now transport gas as well as buy it for
resale. This development means that producers
may sell to gatherers, to brokers, to local distribution companies, or to end users, as well as
to pipelines. The diverse interests of the new
players in the market mean that there is substantially more variety in 1980s contract terms
than in those of the 1970s.
The new generation of gas contracts differs
substantially from gas contracts of the 1970s in
their provisions for term, quantity, and price.
Most current gas contracts are for short terms,
ranging from a few days to a year. The philosophy appears to be "let's go along as long as
we get along," and the short terms are often
coupled with "evergreen" provisions that extend the contract after its initial term until one
of the parties gives notice, usually of only a few
days or weeks, of termination.
Take-or-pay provisions are rarely found in
contracts in mid-1988. A few pipelines still
agree to take or pay for modest percentages of
well delivery capacity-perhaps 15-20 percent-but even they combine the take-or-pay
clause with flexible pricing terms. Short-term
contracts may in fact impose no quantity obligation upon buyers. The longer term contracts
are likely to replace the take-or-pay provision
with a "take or release" clause, which gives the
seller the right to terminate the contract if the
buyer does not take minimum amounts of production.
It is the pricing provisions of the new generation contracts, however, that differ most
sharply from the gas contracts of the 1970s.
New contracts may contain a variety of provisions, including some modeled upon price escalator clauses of the 1970s, but new price
adjustment provisions are much more flexible
and responsive to market demand than their
predecessors of the 1970s.
Perhaps the favorite clause of those purchasing gas for resale-pipelines or gas brokers-is the "net-back" clause. A net-back
clause sets the price to be paid to the producer
by "netting back" the price received from the
ultimate sale, less transportation charges and
costs incurred. The purpose of the net-back
clause is to permit natural gas to compete aggressively with alternative fuels in the pur-

chaser's market area. Under this clause, gas is
sold for whatever the market will bear, and the
producer's price is calculated back. An example
of a net-back clause follows:
Buyer shall pay seller . . . a price per MMBTU,

inclusive of all taxes and other additives, equal
to the weighted average sales price for that
month multiplied by seller's contract percentage, less the sum of (1) all fees and charges
incurred by buyer or its agent to have the gas
purchased hereunder transported .

.

. and (2)

all fees and charges, if any, that buyer charges
seller to dehydrate, compress, treat, meter, condition, or gather the gas. ...
Net-back clauses have caused producers to
become more involved in regulatory rate-making proceedings because what the producer gets
is affected directly by the rates of the transporters. As the cost of transportation increases,
the amount received by the producer declines.
In addition, they raise difficult interpretative
problems that are yet to be litigated, e.g., what
"fees and charges" are "incurred" in transportation.
Another price adjustment clause that permits strong competition between natural gas and
competing fuels is the "meet or release" clause.
A meet or release clause gives the buyer some
assurance that the gas it purchases will be competitive by letting the buyer either force down
the price it pays to the seller or buy from a new
source. Often, meet or release clauses are modeled on market-out clauses:
If . . . the price payable hereunder becomes

uneconomical for Buyer, or the transportation
fees for gas purchased hereunder are increased
or become uneconomical for Buyer, or the price
of any equivalent fuel becomes competitive with
the price of gas hereunder, Buyer will have the
right to nominate .

.

. a new price ....

Seller

will have the option to sell Buyer gas at the new
price.... In the event that Seller does not acdays afcept such lower price within
ter receipt of Buyer's new price nomination,
days written notice
then Buyer, upon
to Seller, may terminate this contract.
In other words, the producer must either meet
the competition or release the buyer frdm the
contract. Meet or release clauses may be drafted
to give the producer the right to demand a higher price, too. Unless they work both ways-for
the producer as well as the buyer-meet or release clauses are not likely to be a satisfactory
pricing device in the long run.
Other price adjustment provisions frequently seen in the mid- 1980s are variations of
the price escalator clauses found in gas contracts of the 1970s. Renegotiation clauses are
frequently used in contracts for both resale and
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for sales to end users. In contrast with their
predecessors, however, new generation renegotiation clauses permit either the buyer or the
seller to demand price renegotiation at frequent
intervals-monthly or quarterly. Price index
clauses are also used, primarily to keep gas competitive with residual fuel oils. Some look very
much like the objective market-out provision
quoted above and require comparison of gas
and fuel oil prices in the burner-tip market.
Others key the contract price of gas to a percentage-e.g., 60 percent of the no. 2 fuel oil
price-in the producing area.
As the title of this article indicates, business
people in the natural gas industry and the attorneys who represent them have learned from
the mistakes they made in gas contracts negotiated and drafted in the 1970s. The new generation of gas contracts is much more market

sensitive than the old. In my opinion, however,
new generation contracts are no more litigation
proof than contracts of the 1970s.
Natural gas is a commodity, and the stakes
are always high in the commodities markets.
Inevitably, there will be winners and losers. The
stakes of the game are lowered by short-term
contracts and by contracts that can be quickly
renegotiated. When large quantities are involved, however-and spot market gas sales
often involve huge quantities in a single transaction-the stakes are greatly increased. In addition, many economists are predicting that
industrial and electric generating customers are
likely to move back to longer term contracts as
the gas surplus dissipates. Under either scenario, the game of gas contract negotiating, drafting, and litigation is likely to continue at a brisk
pace.

The Pipeline Perspective
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Resolving take-or-pay liability is a high
priority during settlement negotiations. Takeor-pay must be addressed in two respects: accrued liability must be resolved and the prospective obligation reduced. The preceding
paragraphs have covered several means of
avoiding take-or-pay obligations prospectively,
primarily by reducing the purchase obligation
and bringing it in line with market demand.
Take-or-pay liability is more important than
ever before, since FERC Order 380 has stripped
away some of the protection pipelines had
against take-or-pay provisions. Historically,
minimum bills served as a strong disincentive
for pipeline customers to buy from other
sources; if a customer failed to purchase its contractual minimum amount, it had to pay for it
anyway. The customer's failure to purchase may
have caused the pipeline to be unable to purchase from the producer, resulting in potential
take-or-pay liability. However, once the customer had made its minimum bill payment, the
pipeline had a pool of funds from which to
draw in making the take-or-pay payment. After
Order 380, this protection is gone.
Consequently, most pipelines make waiver
of accrued take-or-pay liability a condition to
contract renegotiation. Waiver of take-or-pay
claims may also be a condition to joining a pipeline's least-cost plan or special marketing program, although, at least in Texas, such a condition is specifically prohibited by state regulations.
FERC Order 500 has also had an impact on

Continuedfrom page 10

take-or-pay liability. Although FERC cannot revise take-or-pay contracts, it can condition the
producer's access to the pipeline. Order 500 affirms the open access provisions of Order 436
and provides a crediting mechanism for gas
transported. The order provides that if the pipeline transports gas for the producer, the producer must give the pipelines a volume-for-volume
credit toward take-or-pay liability accruing after
January 1, 1986, on any contract between the
same parties, at the pipeline's election. When
the producer's alternative is to give up part of
its take-or-pay claim or have no access to the
market, settlement is a more attractive option.
Another facet of the take-or-pay problem is
whether any outright payment to the producer
for accrued take-or-pay liability must be passed
through to royalty owners. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Mesa Petroleum Company,
Cities Service Oil & Gas Company and Diamond Shamrock Exploration Company v.
Donald P. Hodel and United States Department of Interior, consolidated under Nos. 873195, 87-4069, and 87-3207, decided in August 1988, that for Outer Continental Shelf
Leasing Act (OCSLA) leases, at least, royalty need
not be paid on take-or-pay payments. The producer's posture on the issue may influence his
bargaining position. If he plans to keep the payment, he is less likely to exchange accraed takeor-pay liability in the bargaining process. If the
payment is to be passed through, he may be
willing to trade it away.
Obviously, a pipeline will want to elimi-

